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DUE PROCESS REQuInRs PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
FOR COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS
People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d
352,121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975)
Appellant was convicted in municipal court of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor' and child molestation. 2 Pursuant to the Cali-
fornia statute governing commitment of mentally disordered sex offend-
ers (MDSOs),a the trial court in lieu of sentence certified appellant to
superior court for an initial hearing to determine his mental status.4 The
superior court issued a commitment order.5 Appellant then exercised
his statutory right to a full hearing and petitioned the court to apply a
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.6 This request was re-
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering 1975). Violation of this section is a misde-
meanor, punishable by a $1000 fine, one year's imprisonment, or both.
2. Id. § 647a. Violation of this section is a misdemeanor, punishable by a $500
fine, six months' imprisonment, or both. The record was silent on appellant's precise
offenses, details of which were provided by the Attorney General and accepted as true
by the court. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 311, 535 P.2d 352, 355, 121 Cal. Rptr.
488, 491 (1975). The specific conduct with which Burnick was charged consisted of
four to six homosexual encounters with two boys, aged 13 and 15. Appellant had no
other record of criminal offenses, nor was there evidence of other homosexual conduct
with either minors or adults. Id., 535 P.2d at 355, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
3. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6300 (Deering 1969) defines a mentally disor-
dered sex offender (MDSO) as
any person who by reason of mental defect, disease or disorder is predisposed
to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to
the health and safety of others.
Any criminal conviction can trigger the commitment proceeding; if the trial court
finds probable cause to believe that defendant is an MDSO, it may certify him for ex-
amination in the superior court. Id. § 6302. Upon such certification the superior court
must notify defendant, appoint qualified psychiatrists to examine him, and receive their
written report. Id. § 6303, 6307-08 (Deering Supp. 1975). The statute provides the
defendant with rights to counsel, to be present at the hearing, to confront adverse wit-
nesses, and to subpoena favorable witnesses. Id. § 6305, 6309, 6312, 6314 (Deering
1969). Defendants may also challenge the psychiatric testimony of the state with expert
testimony on their behalf. Id. § 6311.
4. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 311, 535 P.2d 352, 354-55, 121 Cal. Rptr.
488, 490-91 (1975).
5. Id. at 311, 535 P.2d at 355, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
6. The California system provides for an initial determination of mental compe-
tence by the superior court judge alone. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6315-16
(Deering Supp. 1975). If the defendant is found not to be an MDSO, the case is returned
to the original court for further proceedings. Id. § 6315 (Deering Supp. 1975). If the
offender is found to be an MDSO capable of "benefit[ting] by treatment in a state hos-
pital," the court may either remand the case to the original court for "further disposi-
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fused,' and the court, sitting without jury,8 found by a preponderance of
the evidence that appellant was an MDSO "dangerous to the health and
safety of others."9 Appellant was committed indefinitely to a state
hospital."° On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed and
held: The due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and the
California constitution require proof beyond reasonable doubt of all
elements necessary for commitment of mentally disordered sex offend-
ers."1
tion" or order the offender committed to a state hospital for treatment. Id. § 6316
(Deering Supp. 1975). If the superior court issues a commitment order, the defendant
may demand a second hearing, including a jury trial on his mental condition. Id. § 6318
(Deering Supp. 1975). Although the statute provides that the vote of nine of twelve
jurors is sufficient to commit, id. § 6321 (Deering Supp. 1975), a companion case to
Dirnick held that the three-fourths verdict violated both due process and equal protec-
tion, and required a unanimous verdict. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d
373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975). If the jury finds the defendant to be an MDSO, the
court issues a second commitment order similar to the first. CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns
CODE § 6321 (Deering Supp. 1975).
7. 14 Cal. 3d at 311, 535 P.2d at 355, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 491. The court based
it. refusal on the language of § 6321, which states that the MDSO proceeding "shall
be had as provided by law for the trial of civil causes .... " CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 6321 (Deering 1969). The usual standard of proof in civil cases is preponder-
ance of evidence.
8. Section 6318 permits the second hearing to be conducted before either a judge
or a jury at defendant's option. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6318 (Deering Supp.
1975). Burnick originally demanded a jury trial but subsequently waived the demand.
9. Three psychiatrists testified at the hearing. The state's expert thought that re-
peated homosexual encounters with youths were likely, with significant danger of en-
couraging homosexual tendencies in youths undecided about their sexual preferences.
On cross examination, he conceded the possibility that appellant would confine his atten-
tions to overtly homosexual youths, who would suffer no harm. 14 Cal. 3d at 312, 535
P.2d at 355, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
Defendant's experts strongly disagreed. One testified that further seduction of chil-
dren was unlikely, given the strong guilt feelings arising from appellant's current esca-
pade. He also testified that isolated homosexual encounters would have slight effect on
sexually undecided adolescents. Id. Another expert testified that appellant was usually
uninterested in adolescents. He thought that the youths involved had probably initiated
the encounters, and that the average adolescent could have homosexual experiences with-
out serious harm. Id. at 313, 535 P.2d at 356, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
No further evidence was offered. Nonetheless, the trial court, using the preponder-
ance standard, found defendant to be an MDSO. Id. at 311, 535 P.2d at 356, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 491.
10. id., 535 P.2d at 356, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
11. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 332, 535 P.2d 352, 369, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488,
505 (1975). The companion case of People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373,
121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975), held that a less than unanimous jury verdict failed to meet
the reasonable doubt standard. The Feagley court relied on People v. Superior Court,
67 Cal. 2d 929, 434 P.2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1967), which interpreted article I,
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It is now clear that some elements of due process are required in
proceedings that might result in loss of liberty, whether the proceeding is
labelled "civil" or "criminal."' 2 The leading case of In re Gault"8 held
that juvenile hearings must incorporate basic due process safeguards,
including notice, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination,
§ 7 of the California constitution to require unanimous jury verdicts in all criminal
cases. The same reasons that mandated imposition of the reasonable doubt standard re-
quired unanimous jury verdicts in commitment proceedings. Feagley also applied the
reasonable doubt standard to a second class of persons, those found to be MDSOs but
not susceptible of treatment in a state hospital. By statute, such a person may be either
remanded to the original court for disposition of his criminal case or committed indef-
initely to a state institution other than a hospital for "care and treatment." CAL. WELF.
& INsT'NS CoDE § 6316 (Deering Supp. 1975). According to the Feagley court, these
institutions constituted little more than prisons; thus the practice of committing individ-
uals to state units other than mental hospitals violated the offender's constitutional right
to treatment under both the eighth amendment and the California constitution. People
v. Feagley, supra at 376, 535 P.2d at 398, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 534. See note 42 infra.
Feagley thus established that the commitment of the MDSO qua MDSO is constitu-
tionally impermissible unless accompanied by "adequate treatment." Id. at 359, 535
P.2d at 386, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 522. Absent such treatment, the offender may not be
retained in custody. The prospect of adequate treatment therefore appears to be one
of the "dispositive ...facts" that, under Burnick, must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 324, 535 P.2d 352, 364, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488,
500 (1975).
12. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). In each of these cases, the Court emphasized that
the impact of the proceeding on the defendant, rather than the rubric under which it
was conducted, determined the necessity for due process. In Smith, a state habeas
corpus proceeding, the state argued that the writ was a civil remedy; the Court re-
sponded, "The availability of a procedure to regain liberty lost through criminal process
cannot be made contingent upon a choice of labels." 365 U.S. at 712. In Gault, a
juvenile proceeding, the Court stated that "commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It
is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.'" 387 U.S.
at 50. In Winship, another juvenile case, the Court summarized the general rule:
We made it clear in [Gault] that civil labels and good intentions do not them-
selves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts,
for a proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be de-
linquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in se-
riousness to a felony prosecution.
397 U.S. at 365-66.
This concern with the results of state action, rather than the motives that underlie
it, is the basic ground upon which the Burnick majority and dissent clashed in applying
due process. The majority was concerned with the substantive effect the proceeding
could have on the defendant, 14 Cal. 3d at 315, 535 P.2d at 358, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 494;
the dissent focused on the beneficent purposes for which the state acted. Id. at 335,
535 P.2d at 371-72, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08. See In re Winship, supra at 375 (Burger,
CJ., dissenting), discussed in note 46 infra.
13. 387 U.S. 1 (1967), noted in The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv.
69, 171 (1967).
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and confrontation. 14  One month earlier, in Specht v. Patterson,'5 the
14. 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 57.
15. 386 U.S. 605 (1967). In Specht the Court anticipated its ruling in Gault by
discarding the "civil-criminal" distinction in favor of examination of the substantive con-
sequences of commitment under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act. Like the MDSO stat-
ute in California, the Colorado commitment proceeding was triggered by a criminal con-
viction and required proof of the additional facts that defendant was both mentally dis-
ordered and a danger to the community. Since the new findings of fact exposed the
defendant to a significant risk of loss of liberty, the Court in Specht reasoned that he
was entitled to full procedural safeguards in the hearing that determined those facts. Id.
at 608.
Following the Gault rationale, courts have applied procedural safeguards to commit-
ment of the mentally ill. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (proof beyond
reasonable doubt); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (right to hear-
ing, timely notice, counsel, confrontation); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975) (right to hear-
ing, notice, counsel, jury trial); Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972),
aIf'd mem. sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) (hearing); In re Popp, 33
Ohio App. 2d 22, 292 N.E.2d 330 (1972) (right to counsel); In re Levias, 83 Wash.
2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973) (right to hearing, proof by "clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence").
Procedural safeguards have also been applied to the commitment of narcotics addicts,
People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 248 N.E.2d 17, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1969) (right to
trial by jury), and of mentally disordered sex offenders, Specht v. Patterson, supra (right
to hearing, timely notice, and counsel); Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076 (1st Cir.
1973) (right to hearing and to timely assistance of counsel); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 369
F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd sub nom. United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Cough-
fin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976)
(proof beyond reasonable doubt); People v. Studdard, 51 11. 2d 290, 281 N.E.2d 678
(1972) (basic due process protections); People v. Pembrock, 23 Ill. App. 3d 991, 320
N.E.2d 470 (1974) (proof beyond reasonable doubt); Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505,
147 N.W.2d 647 (1967) (right to hearing).
In the related field of persons acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity,
courts have required due process in commitment hearings. United States v. Wright, 511
F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (statutory right to jury trial); United States v. McNeil, 434
F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (right to explicit findings of fact and law to permit appellate
review); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (right to hearing, timely no-
tice, counsel, jury trial); State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 79, 515 P.2d 324 (1973) (burden
of proof on state in termination hearing). When states have established procedures to
commit habitual criminals, procedural safeguards have also been imposed. Tippett v.
Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub
nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (right to hearing, timely
notice, jury trial); United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.
1966) (right to hearing, confrontation); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966
(M.D. Pa. 1971) (right to hearing, counsel, confrontation of opposing witnesses, sub-
poena of friendly ones).
Determining the precise extent of procedural due process required in state commit-
ment hearings poses two difficulties. First, the bounds of due process in state criminal
proceedings are unclear. Justice Black advocated the incorporation theory, under which
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/7
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Supreme Court had invalidated a state sex offender statute that provided
neither notice nor hearing prior to commitment. Neither case dealt
specifically with the appropriate standard of proof. It remained for the
1970 decision in In re Winship 6 to hold that in criminal proceedings a
state must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt,17 and to apply that
due process meant the procedural protections explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights
and no more. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). An alternate theory, whose
foremost advocates included Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, is the natural law theory,
under which due process includes the "requirements of fundamental fairness 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."' Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Such require-
ments are those embedded in the common law, or the absence of which "shocks the con-
science" of the Court. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Adamson
v. California, supra at 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In each case, due process of law requires an evaluation based on a disinterested
inquiry pursued in the spirit of science on a balanced order of facts exactly
and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, . . . on
a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs
both of continuity and of change in a progressive society.
Rochin v. California, supra at 172.
A third theory, identified with Justice Douglas, incorporates both enumerated rights
and peripheral rights implied in the Bill of Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). The current approach, "selective incorporation," holds only some of
the Bill of Rights protections to be elements of fourteenth amendment due process.
Duncan v. Louisiana, supra at 164 (Black, J., concurring); Henkin, Selective Incorpo-
ration in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
A number of specific elements of the Bill of Rights have thus been imposed on state
criminal proceedings. In re Winship, supra (proof beyond reasonable doubt); Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (protection against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Lou-
isiana, supra (right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to
subpoena witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy
trial); Pointer v. Texas, supra (right to confront opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right to refrain from self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
n some recent decisions, the Court declined to apply Bill of Rights protections to
state criminal proceedings. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Lou-
isiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (unanimous jury not required); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970) (twelve-person jury not required). See generally Nagle & Neef, Deduc-
tive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Jury Size and Fraction Required to Convict,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 933.
There is even less agreement on which of these elements of due process must be ap-
plied in noncriminal proceedings that jeopardize individual liberty. For a discussion of
this second major difficulty in determining what process is due in commitment hearings,
see note 20 infra.
16. 397 U.S. 358 (1970), noted in The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L.
Rv. 1, 156 (1970).
17. 397 U.S. at 364. Like Winship, this Comment will discuss the burden of proof
only in terms of the burden of persuasion, ignoring the burden of producing evidence.
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:1092] COMMENTS 1097
ruling to juvenile proceedings on the theory that youthful offenders face
both lengthy incarceration and social stigma.' The Court reasoned
that any possibility of error must be resolved in favor of an individual
facing deprivations of this magnitude, a resolution achieved only by
imposing the reasonable doubt standard.'9 The Supreme Court has yet,
however, to specify the extent to which due process requires this stan-
dard in noncriminal proceedings that jeopardize liberty.20
In civil commitment cases, state courts have developed three stan-
dards of proof.21 Traditionally, courts held that since commitment pro-
18. Id. at 365-67.
19. The concurring opinion of Justice Harlan is of particular importance in applying
the reasonable doubt standard to noncriminal proceedings that threaten individual lib-
erty. Harlan concluded that the function of burden of proof is to allocate the probabil-
ity of error to minimize the social disutility of error. Id. at 371 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). In criminal trials, a governmental burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt
serves additional moral and symbolic values. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Preci-
aion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HAuv. L. REv. 1329, 1378 (1971). In choosing
the appropriate standard of proof for noncriminal proceedings such as civil commit-
ment, recognition of the error-allocating function of the burden of proof provides valu-
able insights. See note 41 infra.
20. The Court declined an opportunity to consider the standard of proof in the anal-
ogous field of indefinite commitment of habitual criminals whose mental disorders in-
dicate a significant likelihood of recidivism. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Court, 407
U.S. 355 (1972). Over a strong dissent by Justice Douglas, the Court dismissed the
petition for certiorari from Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), as im-
providently granted, partly on grounds of mootness and partly because the state was re-
vising the relevant portions of its penal code. 407 U.S. at 357-58.
The reasoning of Specht, Gault, and Winship lends much support to the thesis that
the reasonable doubt standard is required by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488
(1975); notes 26-32 infra and accompanying text. The strongest language supporting full
incorporation of criminal due process into commitment proceedings is found in Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1967), quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Ma-
roney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1965):
A defendant in such proceedings is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant
protections which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings. He
must be afforded all those safeguards which are fundamental rights and essen-
tial to a fair trial ....
As the Burnick dissent noted, however, Specht did not explicitly address the standard
of proof. 14 Cal. 3d at 334, 535 P.2d at 371, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 507. Dictum in the
more recent case of Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), suggests that a preponder-
ance standard would pass constitutional muster: "If the state establishes the need for
treatment by a preponderance of evidence, the court must commit the defendant.. "
Id. at 507.
21. In general, state legislatures have deferred to the judiciary for the choice of an
appropriate standard of proof in commitment proceedings. See Woodby v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1966) (burden of proof in deportation
proceeding left to courts). But cf. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-13-211 (1973) (apply-
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ceedings were civil rather than criminal, the civil standard of pre-
ponderance of evidence governed.22 More recently, concern with the
potential for erroneous confinement led courts to impose the stricter
standard of clear and convincing evidence.23 A growing number of
ing criminal evidence rules to hearings to commit sex offenders); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.05.310 (Supp. 1975) (requiring "clear, cogent and convincing evidence" to
commit mentally disordered persons).
22. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed as improv-
idently granted sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972),
is representative of the decisions upholding the preponderance standard. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the state proceeding to commit indefinitely habitual criminals was
"civil," and satisfied due process by requiring a full hearing with counsel. The court
thought that a standard of clear and convincing evidence would serve no practical pur-
pose, since juries tended to decide on preponderance even when otherwise instructed.
But see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In dissent, Judge Sobeloff opted for
the clear and convincing evidence standard as the best compromise between the state
interest in commitment and the constitutional requirement of due process. Tippett V.
Maryland, supra at 1165-66.
Many courts have accepted the preponderance standard without meaningful discussion
of the issues. E.g., In re Alexander, 372 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Sabon v. People,
142 Colo. 323, 350 P.2d 576 (1960); State Bd. of Control v. Fechner, 192 Minn. 412,
256 N.W. 662 (1934); In re Hogan, 232 Wis. 521, 287 N.W. 725 (1939). See also
Fhagen v. Miller, 65 Misc. 2d 163, 317 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1970), modified and aff'd, 36
App. Div. 2d 926, 321 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 328
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1972) (upholding the preponderance standard for temporary detention
under emergency commitment procedures).
Until 1970 defendants in the District of Columbia who were acquitted by reason of
insanity were also subject to commitment hearings in which the government bore the
burden of proof by preponderance. The constitutionality of the procedure was upheld
in United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For discussion of commit-
ment procedures that follow a successful insanity defense, see note 50 infra.
23. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney
Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Ciancanelli, 26 Ill. App. 3d 884, 326
N.E.2d 47 (1975); In re Sciara, 21 Ill. App. 3d 889, 316 N.E.2d 153 (1974); People
v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro,
- W. Va. -, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974), overruling Schutte v. Schutte, 86 W. Va. 701,
104 S.E. 108 (1920) (requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt). See also Tippett v.
Maryland, 436 F.2d 1152, 1159 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
There is often no discussion of the merits. Lynch v. Baxley, supra, is representative
of the more analytic opinions; it rejected the preponderance standard as inadequate in
light of the effects of commitment on individual liberty. But the court found the
reasonable doubt standard to be impractical for dealing with the subjective conclu-
sions and tentative predictions characteristic of psychiatry. The court chose the clear
and convincing evidence standard as a compromise designed to produce "evidence having
the highest degree of certitude reasonably attainable in view of the matter at issue."
Lynch v. Baxley, supra at 393.
For other applications of the clear and convincing evidence standard, see Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (certain libel suits); Woodby v. Immigration
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:1092] COM NTS 1099
jurisdictions consider commitment proceedings so closely analogous to
criminal trials that only proof beyond reasonable doubt can satisfy due
process.24
In People v. Burnick,25 the California Supreme Court based its deci-
sion primarily on Specht and Winship.26 Although Specht did not
discuss the appropriate standard of proof in sex offender commit-
ments,27 the Burnick majority rationalized the omission by noting that
no court before Specht had explicitly held that the reasonable doubt
standard was an element of procedural due process. 28  Winship provid-
& Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (deportation proceeding); Chaunt v. United
States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (revocation of naturalized citizenship).
24. E.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 369
F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd sub nom. United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Cough-
lin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975); In re Hodges, 325 A.2d 605 (D.C. App. 1974); In re
Pickles, 170 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d
681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); In re Andrews, - Mass. -, 334 N.E.2d 15 (1975); In re
J.W., 44 N.J. Super. 216, 130 A.2d 64 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957); In re Heukelekian,
24 N.J. Super. 407, 94 A.2d 501 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952); Ex parte Perry, 137 N.J.
Eq. 161, 43 A.2d 885 (Ch. 1945); COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 16-13-211 (1973).
Most opinions provide no more than the simple conclusion that when liberty is at
stake, "a reasonable doubt of [defendant's] insanity should be resolved in his favor."
Ex parte Perry, supra at 164, 43 A.2d at 887. Cf. State v. Taylor, 158 Mont. 323, 491
P.2d 877 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972) (in release of defendant acquitted
by reason of insanity any reasonable doubt of his sanity should be resolved in favor of
society). Only United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976), In re Ballay, supra, and
People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975), discussed
the issue in detail.
25. 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975).
26. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
27. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), dealt specifically with the denial of
a hearing and right to counsel. Compare the Burnick court's treatment of Specht with
the rationale of the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520
F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976), in which
the state relied on Specht to contend that a formal hearing and right to counsel were the
outer limits of process due in sex offender commitments. The court distinguished Specht
on the basis that the reasonable doubt standard had not then been held to be an element
of procedural due process. Id. at 935.
28. The majority opinion emphasized the time sequence of Winship and Specht. 14
Cal. 3d at 317, 535 P.2d at 359, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 495. In 1967, when Specht was
heard, no court had explicitly held that the reasonable doubt standard was an element
of due process even in criminal cases. Moreover, the Gerchman decision, a cornerstone
of Specht, had declined to require a jury trial for commitment of sex offenders on the
explicit ground that jury trials had not been held a fundamental procedural right.
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ed that explicit holding.29  Moreover, the Burnick court noted, the
Court's concern in Winship with lengthy incarceration and social stigma
was equally applicable to MDSO proceedings, which expose defendants
to equal or greater loss of liberty than do juvenile proceedings, 80 and to
significantly greater social stigma.8' The California court concluded,
"under Specht, this defendant is entitled to all the safeguards of due
process of law, and under Winship those safeguards must include the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 82
The three dissenters observed that Specht was silent on the standard
of proof,"3 and reasoned that Winship, which dealt with juvenile trials,
United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 313 (3d Cir. 1965). The
Burnick majority relied heavily on the language in Specht that defendants in commit-
ment proceedings are entitled to the 'full panoply" of due process safeguards. See note
15 supra. Since Winship subsequently held proof beyond reasonable doubt to be one
such safeguard required in all criminal trials, so, reasoned the Burnick majority, does
Specht in commitment proceedings. 14 Cal. 3d at 318, 535 P.2d at 359, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 495.
29. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 359 (1970).
30. Juveniles are normally released from custody upon attaining their majority,
whereas MDSO proceedings may result in indefinite commitment. Compare CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 1769-71 (Deering 1969) (release of juveniles on attaining
majority) with id. § 6316 (Deering Supp. 1975) (MDSO to be held for indefinite pe-
riod). Moreover, MDSOs are committed to state mental hospitals or other institutions,
which the Burnick majority found to bear a remarkable resemblance to jails. In con-
trast, juveniles are eligible for probation or placement in a number of less restrictive set-
tings. 14 Cal. 3d at 320, 535 P.2d at 361, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
31. The majority isolated four respects in which the social stigma of MDSO commit-
ment exceeded the odium of a juvenile conviction. First, the public is more frightened
by and mistrustful of the mentally ill. Second, sexual perversity strikes a peculiarly
sensitive chord in the public mind. Third, juvenile proceedings are confidential and
juvenile records subject to destruction after the court's custody is terminated; neither is
true with MDSO hearings. Finally, the public is likely to be far more forgiving of
juvenile indiscretions than of sexual misconduct by an adult. 14 Cal. 3d at 322, 535
P.2d at 362, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
32. Id. at 324-25, 535 P.2d at 364, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 500 (footnote omitted). The
state's counterarguments received short shrift. The predictive nature of the commit-
ment proceeding did not warrant a reduction in the state's burden of proof, the majority
reasoned, because psychiatrists are no more accurate in predicting dangerousness than
are jurors in assessing the probability of past events. See note 44 infra.
Defendant's prior conviction does not justify a lesser standard of proof at the commit-
ment hearing; as Specht makes clear, the latter hearing makes a new factual determina-
tion, jeopardizing defendant's liberty, in which due process is required. The claim that
juries merely confirm the diagnosis of psychiatrists, a diagnosis that cannot be expressed
beyond reasonable doubt, confuses the role of witness and jury. The witness states an
expert opinion; the jury determines if the sum total of the evidence fulfills the standard
of proof. That the state's proof is inherently weak does not warrant lowering the stand-
ard of proof. Id. at 325-30, 535 P.2d at 364-68, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 500-04.
33. 14 Cal. 3d at 334, 535 P.2d at 371, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 507. The dissent also
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was less analogous to MDSO proceedings than were prior California
decisions concerning commitment of narcotics addicts.34 These deci-
sions emphasized the rehabilitative purposes of the statute and held that
the burden on the state should not exceed the degree of assurance with
which reputable physicians could reasonably be expected to speak.35
Finally, the dissent stressed that the state could neither prove insanity
nor predict dangerousness beyond reasonable doubt; hence, imposition
of the reasonable doubt standard would prevent the state from achieving
the benefits of MDSO commitments.3 6
Courts that have dealt with the standard of proof required for civil
commitment have, in general, offered little support for their conclu-
sions."7 By contrast, the Burnick court discussed in detail both legal
noted the dictum in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 507 (1972), quoted in note 20
supra.
34. 14 Cal. 3d at 334, 535 P.2d at 371, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 507. See People v. Moore,
69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968); In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d
128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1963); People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895,
67 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968). Moore affirmed the Valdez reasoning that the distinction
between criminal confinement and civil commitment for rehabilitative purposes was suf-
ficiently clear to render the reasonable doubt standard unnecessary. These cases are in
accord with the older view that emphasized the beneficent purpose of the state in deter-
mining which, if any, elements of due process must be applied. See note 12 infra. The
dissent also reasoned that subsequent judicial review was adequate to prevent groundless
continuation of commitment, and that this review was an additional reason obviating the
need for the reasonable doubt standard. 14 Cal. 3d at 335-36, 535 P.2d at 372, 121
Cal. Rptr. at 508.
35. 14 Cal. 3d at 335, 535 P.2d at 372, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 508. The dissent relied
on People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 67 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968), as support for
this argument. Valdez held that "the People's burden of persuasion ought to be no
greater than the degree of assurance with which reputable physicians express them-
selves." id. at 903, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 589. Valdez in turn relied upon Bauman v. San
Francisco, 42 Cal. App. 2d 144, 163 (1940), in which plaintiff was required to prove
that future damages were reasonably certain to occur. Bauman held that plaintiff's ex-
pert testimony on the issue was admissible, although the expert refused to state that he
was reasonably certain that further injuries would develop; but it did not lower the plain-
tiff's burden of persuasion. Bauman, in short, held that expert witnesses need not state
their opinions with the same degree of certainty by which the factfinder tests the ade-
quacy of the plaintiff's entire case. The case thus offers no support for the thesis that
the burden of proof may be lowered to meet the inadequacies of the plaintiff's proof.
The Valdez rule is plainly insupportable. A proper application of Bauman to MDSO
hearings would permit psychiatrists to testify that a defendant was mentally disordered,
whatever the psychiatrists' level of certainty; but the overall burden would remain upon
the state to prove defendant's insanity by whatever standard of proof was appropriate,
employing the expert testimony and whatever other evidence might be available.
36. 14 Cal. 3d at 332, 535 P.2d at 370, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
37. See cases cited notes 22-24 supra. In People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895,
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precedent and social concern. The analogy to Winship is clear and
persuasive, sufficient alone to warrant the result.88
The Burnick court's reliance on Specht is less convincing. Specht did
not mention burden of proof; a majority of the Supreme Court has never
accepted the sweeping dictum that civil commitment requires the same
due process safeguards as do criminal trials.80 Nor should it, at least
67 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968), the California court misunderstood its precedent. See note 35
supra. Courts in other jurisdictions have fared no better. For example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court accepted the preponderance standard for commitment of the mentally ill
without significant discussion. In re Hogan, 232 Wis. 521, 287 N.W. 725 (1939). One
year later, the same court, in an opinion by the same justice, held that a living individual
could be deprived of control of his property only on clear and convincing evidence of
incompetency, because such was the degree of proof required in will contests. In re
Olson, 236 Wis. 301, 295 N.W. 24 (1940). That rule, of course, reflects the difficulty
of assessing the competence of an individual no longer available for psychiatric examina-
tion, see In re Colton's Estate, 166 A. 521, 526 (N.J. Prerogative Ct. 1933), and has
no relevance to an incompetency proceeding in which the alleged incompetent is contest-
ing his incapacity. The anomalous result of Hogan and Olson was that one might be
deprived of his liberty by a mere preponderance of evidence, but could only lose control
of his property on clear and convincing evidence. It is not known how many persons
committed to state mental institutions continued to manage their own business affairs.
38. See, e.g., Stachulak v. Coughlin, 369 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1973), afl'd sub
nom. United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976) (Winship was the basis for decision to
require proof beyond reasonable doubt in sex offender commitments). The Burnick
dissent was least effective in its discussion of Winship, which it incorrectly attempted
to distinguish on two grounds. First, the dissent reasoned, juvenile hearings consider
factual questions while MDSO proceedings attempt predictive judgments. 14 Cal. 3d at
333, 535 P.2d at 370, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The new "label of convenience" is irrel-
evant; the substantive effects of the proceeding upon the defendant were the rationale
for the ruling in Winship. Those effects are not altered by the predictive nature of the
hearing. Second, the dissent reasoned, MDSO proceedings follow criminal trials in
which the defendant has been proven guilty of a crime beyond reasonable doubt. 14 Cal.
3d at 334, 535 P.2d at 370, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 506. MDSO hearings, however, expose
defendents to significantly greater jeopardy. Burnick, for instance, could have received a
maximum sentence of eighteen months in the court which convicted him; but his com-
mitment was for "an indeterminate period." CAL. WELF. & INS''NS CODE § 6316 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1975).
The Burnick majority, however, significantly weakened the persuasive force of Win-
ship by subordinating it to the Specht dictum that sex offenders are entitled to the full
panoply of criminal due process protections. By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in United
States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976) relied exclusively on Winship in imposing the rea-
sonable doubt standard on Illinois sex offender commitment proceedings. The state had
argued that Specht defined the outer limits of due process as the right to a hearing and
counsel. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Specht on the ground that in Specht the bur-
den of proof was not an issue. Id. at 935.
39. In an area of the law so imprecise as the extent of due process required in non-
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:1092] COMMENTS 1103
with respect to standards of proof. The proper burden of proof in any
category of proceeding requires an assessment of the probability of error
in favor of each party and the relative social costs of such errors.4" The
criminal proceedings, courts should be cautious in relying on such sweeping dicta, espe-
cially in opinions by Justice Douglas. Compare People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 317,
535 P.2d 352, 359, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 495 (Specht held that Colorado sex offender
statute was "deficient in due process 'as measured by the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment' "), with Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 411 (2d Cir. 1970) (Specht
held that "defendant must be represented by counsel" when new finding of fact may im-
pose different punishment than specified in statute under which defendant pleaded
guilty).
40. No decisionmaking process can ever be completely free of error; even in assess-
ing past events one can never assert with positive certainty that a particular event oc-
curred. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 359, 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
rational decisionmaker, recognizing this metaphysical truth, therefore designs the judicial
machinery to minimize the impact of these errors. See generally Ball, The Moment of
Truth: Probability Theory and Standard of Proof, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 807 (1961);
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. Rav. 1065 (1968);
McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. Rav. 242 (1944). But see
Tribe, supra note 19, at 1378.
The social consequences of some errors are obviously far worse than the consequences
of other errors. The celebrated formula that one hundred guilty men should be freed
rather than one innocent man unjustly convicted, cf. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:
Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 385 n.64 (1970),
represents a social belief that the consequences of erroneous conviction are more than
100 times greater than the social costs of erroneous acquittal. When the net social cost
of error in one direction is equal to the net social cost of error in the other, social wel-
fare is maximized only by decreasing the absolute number of errors. When the net social
cost of error in one direction is extremely large, and the net loss from error in the other
direction is low, social welfare is maximized by making the probability of the former
error many times smaller than the probability of the latter. Thus, it is correct but some-
what misleading to state:
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process
of placing on the other party the burden of. . . persuading the factfinder at
the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (emphasis added). The statement is
misleading because if the other party also has at stake an interest of "transcending
value," the cost of erroneous decision against him would be equally great. If we hypoth-
esize a trial in which the liberty of both parties is at stake, society would be indifferent
about the direction of error and concerned only with reducing the absolute number of
errors. It is comparative social cost of error, rather than its absolute magnitude, that
is important.
Moreover, the probability of error in favor of one party may be significantly higher
in some situations. If the evidence before the court is consistently biased in favor of
one party in a certain class of cases, the probability of error in his favor may exceed
the probability of erroneous decision against him. Again, the comparative rather than
the absolute probability is the critical factor.
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burden of proof may then be altered to minimize the social cost of errors
in the decision-making process.41
41. The proper burden of proof in any class of proceedings allocates the risks of
error to minimize the social costs of error. When society is indifferent about the direc-
tion of error, the goal is to minimize the probability of error. In most instances, a pre-
ponderance standard will accomplish this result. A higher burden of proof on one party
would make it more difficult for him to prevail, thus increasing the chances of an errone-
ous decision against him.
When the social cost of error differs, however, this increased chance of an erroneous
decision against one party is precisely what is desired. The ideal standard of proof would
equate total risk of error in one direction, defined as probability of error multiplied by
its social cost, with total risk of error in the other direction. Assuming that social costs
are fixed, this result is achieved by varying the probability of error; the burden of proof
accomplishes this function. Symbolically, (P..) (C..) should equal (Po) (C00 )
where P.. represents the probability of erroneous conviction, C. represents the social
cost of erroneous conviction, P.. represents the probability of erroneous acquittal and
C.. the social cost of erroneous acquittal. If C.o is arbitrarily assumed to be at least
100 times greater than C.., the burden of proof should be manipulated so
that P0, is less than one percent of P... The differential probability should thus vary
inversely with the differential social cost.
Kaplan expressed the same concept in different fashion. In the Kaplan scheme,
1
P - ., where P is the probability of guilt necessary to convict, Dc is the dis-
Dg
1+ -
Di
utility of acquitting the guilty, and D, is the disutility of convicting the innocent. Again,
the fraction DdD, represents the differential social cost of the two errors; the Kaplan
formula reflects that differential in the varying level of proof required. Kaplan,
supra note 40, at 1072.
Tribe has argued strongly that such mathematical analysis is inappropriate in the con-
text of a criminal trial. Tribe, supra note 40 at 385-87; Tribe, supra note 19. Most of his
criticism has turned on the attempt to quantify explicitly the variables involved, Tribe,
supra note 19, at 1330 n.2, and to apply the model on an ad hoc basis to derive a dif-
ferent standard of proof for each trial. Id. at 1385. He has not questioned the utility
of a cost-benefit analysis as a general method of thinking about burden of proof. Id. at
1386. Moreover, much of the symbolic value which Tribe has attached to the ritual of
trial is applicable to criminal trials only and of correspondingly less importance in non-
criminal proceedings that may result in loss of liberty.
The concept of social disutility provides a rational explanation for the proper
standard of proof in negligence trials, deportation proceedings, and noncriminal hearings
that jeopardize personal liberty. In negligence cases, society does not care which party
assumes the cost of injury; preponderance of evidence is the appropriate standard. In
deportation proceedings, a significant infringement on individual liberty is possible; the
social cost of erroneous expulsion from the country is significantly greater than the so-
cial cost of an erroneous decision permitting the alien to remain. In proceedings that
actually incarcerate a convicted defendant society has determined that the value
of individual freedom is immensely greater than the social interest in punishment
and rehabilitation; a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt thus allocates errors to
conform to our notions of social utility. In each situation, with the possible exception
of the criminal trial, a proper decision on burden of proof can only be reached by bal-
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Although Burnick discussed the relevant social interests, it failed to
use such an explicit balancing process. 42  In commitment proceedings,
ancing the probabilities and costs of errors in each direction for the class of proceedings
as a whole-a point overlooked by much of case law. Cf. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 494-95 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (erroneous admission of involuntary con-
fessions more serious than erroneous exclusion of voluntary confessions; hence, pre-
ponderance standard for test of voluntariness is too lax).
42. There is a twofold social interest in commitment. First, the state has an inter-
est in promoting the physical and mental health of its citizenry, commonly known as
the parens patriae doctrine. See In re Oakes, 8 Law Rept. 122 (Mass. 1855); Develop-
ments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAav. L. REv. 1190, 1199
(1974). When the individual is mentally disturbed to the point that he is dangerous
to himself, or has lost the capacity for rational decision regarding his need for treatment,
parens patriae dictates involuntary confinement. For a discussion of the state statutes
dealing with parens patriae commitments, see MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 36-
49 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock ed. 1971). An erroneous decision not to commit will
forfeit the social interest in the health of the individual, the welfare of his family, and
the reduction of public charges accomplished by effective treatment. On the other hand,
an erroneous decision to confine deprives the individual of his freedom and privacy, sub-
jects him to social stigma, and condemns a sane man to compulsory mind-altering treat-
ment in the insane world of the mental institution. "The mental attitude of one who
is falsely found insane and relegated to life imprisonment is beyond conception. No
greater cruelty can be committed in the name of the law." 5 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1400 at 201 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). If the involuntarily
committed patient is not insane when he enters the hospital, he may well be mentally
disordered after "treatment." Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA
CLAMA LAw. 379, 398 (1973), reprinted from 179 ScIENcE, Jan. 19, 1973, at 250. Thus,
the social cost of erroneous confinement far exceeds the damage done by erroneous re-
lease, warranting a burden on the state of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Develop-
ments in the Law, supra at 1299-1300.
Protection of the health of the individual is an increasingly disfavored justification
for social action that intrudes on liberty. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 359 (1970);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Such judicial skepticism perhaps reflects the oft-quoted
warning of Justice Brandeis:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the Government's purposes are beneficial. Men born to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil minded rulers. The greatest of
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Even
when the legislature has acted primarily for the benefit of the individual, courts have
rationalized the law in terms of other social interests. See, e.g., People v. Carmichael, 53
Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (J.P. Ct. 1967), rev'd, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d
931 (Genesee County Ct. 1968) (motorcycle helmet law). See generally Note, Limiting
the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 605,
615 (1970).
The obvious corollary of the parens patriae rationale for commitment is that the indi-
vidual must be susceptible to and receive some type of treatment. Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (status of narcotics addiction alone insufficient to warrant
incarceration); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (failure to provide adequate treatment renders hospital
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psychiatrists often diagnose the sane as disordered" and the innocuous
officials liable for damages to person committed); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)
(injunction will issue to require state to provide adequate treatment); People V. Feagley,
14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975) (persons not susceptible to
treatment in state hospital may not be confined in penal institutions in which inadequate
treatment is provided).
The quality of the treatment required by the United States Constitution is an open
question. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly held that an involuntarily committed patient
"has a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him an op-
portunity to be cured or improve his mental condition." Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra
at 520; see also Wyatt v. Aderholt, supra at 1312-14. But the Supreme Court's narrow
holding in Donaldson imposed no such mandate and the Court took pains to point out
that its opinion, not the Fifth Circuit's, was the governing law of the case. 422 U.S.
at 577-78 n.12. California, however, requires "adequate treatment" to avoid the state
constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. People v. Feagley, supra at 359,
535 P.2d at 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
The second rationale for commitment, that mental deviants may be dangerous to the
rest of the community, presents more complex issues of social policy. Although the dis-
utility of erroneous confinement remains the same, the social cost of erroneous release
may be considerably greater. Were it possible to reliably predict strong antisocial char-
acter traits, the civil commitment process might serve far greater social values than the
criminal justice system. See note 47 infra. The social cost of the erroneous release of an
MDSO could in theory exceed the cost of erroneous acquittal of a substantive crime,
thus warranting a less stringent standard of proof. In contrast to the potential criminal's
probable immunity from preventive detention, mental illness may support incarceration
on grounds of dangerousness to the community. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C.), aff'd per
curam sub nom. Overholser v. Williams, 252 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
The flaw in this theoretical analysis, of course, is the dubious assumption that
modem psychiatric analysis is capable of accurate diagnosis of the insane and reli-
able prediction of dangerousness. See notes 43-44 infra.
43. Evidence of the inaccuracy of psychiatric evaluation is legion. See People v.
Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 325-27, 535 P.2d 352, 365-67, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501-03
(1975); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693 (1974); Rosenhan, supra note 42; Rubin, Pre-
diction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 AacH. GEN. PsYcu. 397 (1972);
Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals: Perspec-
tives and Problems, 56 VA. L. Rnv. 602, 619 (1970); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Vio-
lence Be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393 (1972); Developments in the Law,
supra note 42, at 1243.
Illustrative of these surveys is the Rosenhan experiment. Eight normal individuals
gained admission to 12 different mental institutions by falsely alleging that they had
heard voices saying "empty," "hollow," and "thud." No other false behavior was sim-
ulated, and after admission all ceased to exhibit any abnormalities. All were admitted,
eleven under diagnosis of schizophrenia, while the twelfth (with identical symptoms)
was diagnosed as manic depressive. Their fellow patients immediately recognized the
deception; the hospital staffs could not. The patients were discharged with a diagnosis
of schizophrenia in remission. Rosenhan, supra note 42, cited in Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d
at 326 n.16, 535 P.2d at 365 n.16, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 501 n.16.
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as dangerous." Explicit balancing of the risk of error would reveal that
commitment proceedings offer a high probability of erroneous confine-
ment and a relatively smaller social interest in the confinement of any
one person. 5 The dissent's concern with the inability of the state to
prove a commitment case beyond reasonable doubt would be seen in its
proper light as the single strongest argument supporting the majority
44. The accuracy of current psychiatric techniques in predicting dangerousness is
quite low. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 43; Wenk, Robison & Smith, supra note
43. "Operation Baxtrom" exemplifies the inadequacy of these techniques. Pursuant to
the Supreme Court ruling in Baxtrom v. Herald, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), 989 persons or-
iginally classified as sufficiently dangerous to warrant treatment in maximum security
hospitals were transferred to civil hospitals. Only seven later proved so obstreperous
to require return to the maximum security institutions. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d
306, 326 n.17, 535 P.2d 352, 365 n.17, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501 n.17 (1975).
Somewhat higher percentages of accuracy have been achieved in small, selected sam-
ples that used large quantities of detailed information about each individual whose be-
havior was being predicted. Developments in the Law, supra note 42, at 1243-44. The
typical commitment proceeding does not even attempt such detailed investigation. Id.
at 1244-45. Moreover, the most critical variable in predictive accuracy was prior aggres-
sive behavior, id. at 1244, but sex offenders tend not to be aggressive. Tappan, Some
Myths About the Sex Offender, 19 FEa. PROBATION 7 (June 1955). Finally, the inci-
dence of recidivism among sex criminals is quite low, id. at 8, a factor that is critical
for accurate prediction of dangerousness. The mathematics of predictive tests dictate
that when "the behavior which the test seeks to predict is rare, the ratio of false posi-
tives to true positives will be very large unless the predictive devices are extremely ac-
curate." Developments in the Law, supra note 42, at 1242 (emphasis added). See also
Wenk, Robison & Smith, supra note 43; Developments in the Law, supra note 42, at
1302-03 n.215. The absolute number of offenders falsely identified as dangerous will
thus far exceed the number of persons correctly identified as dangerous. Consequently,
the commitment process is inherently biased in favor of erroneous incarceration. De-
velopments in the Law, supra note 42, at 1242.
45. Both aspects of the risk allocation process dictate the use of a reasonable doubt
standard. First, the probability of erroneous confinement is significantly greater than
the probability of erroneous release, given the systematic overprediction of dangerous-
ness, see note 44 supra. Second, the social costs of erroneous confinement are much
greater than the social costs of erroneous release. The individual is interested in retain-
ing his liberty and averting the stigma of commitment for sexual perversity. The social
interest in the commitment of any one individual, however, is low since there is but a
relatively low probability that he will commit an antisocial act injurious to others. The
state's interest in avoiding erroneous release pales by comparison with the individual's
interest in averting erroneous incarceration.
Obviously, there will be far fewer persons committed under the reasonable doubt
standard. But the public is not thereby endangered. Because the MDSO proceeding is
triggered by a criminal conviction, and persons found not to be MDSOs are returned
to the original court for further action, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6315 (Deering
Supp. 1975), the normal safeguards of the criminal law remain for societal protection.
If current criminal statutes provide inadequate sentences, the legislature retains the
power to alter them. See People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 376, 535 P.2d 373, 398,
121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 534 (1975).
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result. That is, given the high probability of error in its favor, and its
relatively small interest in a single commitment, the state should bear the
heaviest burden of proof.46 Moreover, the balancing approach would
permit adjustment of the standard of proof should psychiatric evaluation
and prediction become markedly more accurate.47 Explicit balancing
of the risks of error would produce a more flexible and more clearly
defensible decision than the implicit weighing in Burnick.
In addition to requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt in MDSO
proceedings, Burnick surely requires that California proceedings to
commit the mentally retarded48 employ a reasonable doubt standard. 49
46. The inability of the state to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt means only
that the social interest in commitment cannot outweigh the intrusion on individual lib-
erty. The problem is not that the social interest in treating and restraining potentially
dangerous sex deviates is not great; rather, we lack the proper tools to implement that
interest. In this context, Chief Justice Burger's lament that the juvenile court system
needs to escape the "straitjacket" of due process, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 359, 376
(1970) (Burger, CJ., dissenting), approaches the problem backwards. Were the juve-
nile justice system fulfilling the good intentions of its creators the reasonable doubt
standard might well be inappropriate, because the social risk of erroneous release would
be much greater. Given the sobering reality that in commitment of the mentally ill,
no less than in juvenile hearings, we do not know how to achieve our laudable purposes,
see notes 43-44 supra, the social disutility of erroneous release of any one individual
is comparatively small. The likelihood that any one individual who has been diagnosed
as a "dangerous" sex deviant will again engage in dangerous conduct is low. See note
44 supra.
47. The social interest in commitment, being prospective, is greater than the social
interest in jailing the criminal. Retribution aside, the punishment of criminal offenders
may be justified for rehabilitation, general deterrence, or incapacitation. Given a con-
stitutional right to treatment, see note 42 supra, the rehabilitative efforts of a system
dealing with the mentally ill should be more successful than those of the criminal sys-
tem. The assumption behind incapacitation is that the individual who has sinned once
is likely to sin again; while he is incarcerated, society is protected from his onslaughts.
Some offenders are likely repeaters; others are not. A system of psychiatric evaluation
geared specifically to the detection of probable future offenders, if accurate, should be
superior to the blanket approach of the penal system. Only in general deterrence does
the penal system look to the future, and the efficacy of general deterrence is question-
able. See L. HALL & S. GLtIECK, CRMNAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 17 (2d ed. 1951).
But see Andanaes, The General Preventive Effect of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. Rv.
949 (1966).
Should the evaluative and predictive techniques of psychiatry improve in accuracy, the
social interest in commitment of any one individual would be correspondingly greater.
The likelihood of that one individual engaging in dangerous activities would be much
greater, while the probability of erroneous confinement due to systemic bias would
shrink. Thus, due process might be satisfied by proof by clear and convincing evidence.
48. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6500-12 (Deering 1969, Supp. 1975).
49. This conclusion is justified on either due process or equal protection grounds.
Having established the reasonable doubt standard for one group of involuntarily corn-
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Equal protection may require a similar standard for commitment of de-
fendants acquitted by reason of insanity." The consequence should be
mitted persons, the MDSOs, the state can hardly justify a different standard of proof
for narcotics addicts or the mentally retarded unless it could demonstrate that predictive
techniques for such groups were significantly more accurate than those employed for
MDSOs. See Baxtrom v. Herald, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d
338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
50. See Baxtrom v. Herald, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1968); cf. United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Cali-
fornia defendants are entitled to acquittal when a preponderance of the evidence indi-
cates mental incapacity. People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288, 363 P.2d 865, 14 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1961); People v. McBride, 135 Cal. App. 522, 27 P.2d 776 (1933). If proof be-
yond reasonable doubt is required to commit, there may be a gap through which felons
can escape.
The District of Columbia Circuit has wrestled with this problem for years. Under
federal law a reasonable doubt of the sanity of the defendant warrants acquittal in crim-
inal proceedings. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). Before 1970 involun-
tary commitment of such offenders required the government to prove present insanity
and present dangerousness by a preponderance of evidence. Bolton v. Harris, supra.
Thus, when the accused cast reasonable doubt on his sanity, but the government failed
to marshal a preponderance of evidence of his mental incapacity, the defendant was ac-
quitted of criminal charges but was not committed.
In United States v. Brown, supra, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the pre-
ponderance standard was a constitutionally permissible burden in proceedings to commit
defendants previously acquitted by reason of insanity. "[E]ven assuming a higher
standard is required prior to civil commitment," the court reasoned that defendants ac-
quitted by reason of insanity occupied a different position than noncriminal offenders,
since these persons had previously been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of anti-
social conduct, and since Congress might well wish to discourage false insanity pleas.
A strong dissent by Judge Wright reasoned that past antisocial conduct was not disposi-
tive of the defendant's current mental state, 478 F.2d at 613, and that the equal protec-
tion analysis of Baxtrom v. Herald, supra, demanded equal treatment of all classes of
offenders at commitment hearings. 478 F.2d at 613. As a matter of logic, the dissent
was correct. Equal protection therefore requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to com-
mit defendants acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity.
The current District of Columbia practice is similar to the statutory procedure em-
ployed in California. Persons acquitted by reason of insanity are automatically commit-
ted for a specific period; thereafter, the burden is on the defendant to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he has recovered his sanity and deserves release. D.C.
CoDE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1973). But the constitutional status of this procedure is ques-
tionable. Compare In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1972) (upholding California statute against due process and equal protection chal-
lenges), with United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 624 (1971) (Bazelon, C.J., con-
curring) (questioning due process aspects of the new District of Columbia statute).
The gap between standards for commitment and insanity acquittal may be of small
practical importance. The experience in the District of Columbia before the 1970
change suggested that the insanity defense rarely succeeded, and that virtually all suc-
cessful insanity pleas resulted in commitment. United States v. Wright, 511 F.2d 1311
(D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1172 n.73 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
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a significant reduction in the number of persons committed under each
of these kinds of proceedings.5 ' Finally, Burnick is persuasive author-
ity that the state may be required to shoulder a burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt at hearings in which the offender seeks release on
the ground that he is cured. 52 If initial commitment is warranted only
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt, continuation of custody can only
be justified on a similar showing by the state.58
51. Of course, since MDSO proceedings are triggered by criminal conviction, the of-
fender who escapes commitment must face whatever sentence the original court chooses
to impose. See People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 376, 535 P.2d 373, 398, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 534 (1975). That sentence, however, is fixed by statute, in distinct contrast
to the indefinite commitment permitted in MDSO prbceedings. Burnick, for instance,
could have received a maximum sentence of eighteen months for his misdemeanor con-
victions, see notes 1 & 2 supra. Alternatively, the state might commit the offender as an
MDSO, but limit the commitment to the maximum sentence fixed by the statute
which he had been convicted of violating. Under those circumstances the MDSO pro-
ceeding would not jeopardize personal freedom, though it might increase stigma, and
would arguably not require due process protections. The New Jersey sex offender stat-
ute, N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:164-6-b (1971), which imposes such a ceiling on the commit-
ment, has been upheld against due process challenges. United States ex rel. Demeter
v. Yeager, 418 F.2d 612 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970).
52. Standards for release vary. Some states require the offender to prove his recov-
ery, but only by a preponderance of evidence. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126,
496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972); Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752 (Del. 1968);
Newton v. Brooks, 246 Ore. 484, 426 P.2d 446 (1967). Some impose a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard, or some variant, on the offender. See, e.g., State v. Carter,
64 N.J. 382, 408, 316 A.2d 449, 463 (1974); State v. Blubaugh, 80 Wash. 2d 28, 36,
491 P.2d 646, 651 (1971) (restoration of sanity must be "highly probable"). A few
even require offenders to prove their sanity beyond reasonable doubt. Chase v. Kearns,
278 A.2d 132 (Me. 1971); State v. Taylor, 158 Mont. 323, 491 P.2d 877 (1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972). Arizona places a continuing burden on the state to justify
by a preponderance of the evidence the retention of either an insanity acquitted defend-
ant or a mentally disordered individual. State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 79, 515 P.2d 324
(1973).
53. A criminal conviction justifies incarceration of the defendant for the full term
of his sentence. Civil commitment deals not with the factual record of past conduct
but with the present mental condition of the offender and an estimate of his future be-
havior; it is justified only when he is both mentally ill and dangerous to himself or oth-
ers. Both conditions are obviously subject to change. Since commitment cannot
be justified for longer than their simultaneous coexistence, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 575 (1975), there should remain a continuing burden on the state to warrant
its action. When the balance of interests dictates that the state must shoulder a burden
of proof beyond reasonable doubt to commit initially, it would no less dictate that the
burden of proof for continuing commitment also rests upon the state, sustainable only
by the same degree of proof. At most the defendant should bear the burden of produc-
ing evidence indicating his recovery; once such evidence is produced, the burden of per-
suasion should be upon the state to prove beyond reasonable doubt that continued com-
mitment is warranted.
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